early publication, another consideration had counseled delay. Premature announcement, the biochemist had feared, would ultimately harm rather than help the public. He would have preferred to establish a patent before publishing. Both his journal article and the Science announcement noted, "To protect the interest of the public in the possible commercial use of these and other findings soon to be published, applications for Letters Patent, both as to processes and products, have been filed with the United States Patent Office." In his eyes, a patent could insure the public against unscrupulous merchants and could encourage reputable manufacturers to develop vitamin-D-enriched products. At the same time, royalties generated by the patent could support further research, both his own and that of others at the University of Wisconsin. The controversy surrounding Steenbock's efforts to patent the irradiation process and the subsequent development of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation to manage the patents, their licenses, and their royalties provide a significant case study of the tensions and conflicts that arise at the intersection of university research and commercial enterprise. It demonstrates both the ways in which the work of academic laboratories can influence manufacturing and how the needs of the marketplace can shape the interests of academic scientists.
I. STEENBOCK'S BACKGROUND
Steenbock's decision to patent reflected concerns and interests that had shaped his life from childhood.4 Brought up on a family farm in Wisconsin, he understood the importance of agriculture, particularly dairy farming, to the state's economy. And early in his scientific career he recognized the commercial significance of university research in farming.
Steenbock graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1908 and was immediately hired as a research assistant by E. B. Hart, chair of the Department of Agricultural Chemistry. This employment put him in close contact with some of the most creative researchers in biochemistry, including Stephen Babcock and Elmer Verner McCollum. Steenbock's name first appeared on a scientific publication in 1911, for research conducted under Hart and McCollum. In this innovative study, the "single grain ration experiment," four groups of cows were fed carefully controlled diets: one of corn, one of wheat, one of oats, and one a combination of the three. The researchers constructed each ration to supply all the known components necessary for healthful growth. As near as contemporary chemistry could determine, each ration was analytically identical with the others. Nonetheless the groups of cows differed markedly in their development. Though the researchers were unable to determine the cause of these differences, this path-breaking experiment established Steenbock's interest in nutrition research, an interest that later led to his important vitamin discoveries. As a research assistant Steenbock was in a position to observe closely a department that, under the tutelage of Hart and Babcock and with the support of Harry L. Russell, formidable dean of the College of Agriculture, had successfully turned university research into practical applications appreciated by the state's farmers.5 The most visible of these successes was the invention of the Babcock tester. In 1890 Babcock announced his invention for quickly and accurately measuring the butterfat content of milk. Farmers and cheese makers had long recognized the need for such a device: many of the state's dairy farmers sold their milk directly to cheese factories, where the milk's butterfat content set the price. The Babcock tester eliminated the need for highly sophisticated chemical tests or guesswork. With the tester the farmer and the manufacturer had an on-site, authoritative gauge of butterfat content. Following Babcock's announcement many companies quickly began to manufacture a Babcock tester.
II. THE DECISION TO PATENT
Three and a half decades later, during his earliest vitamin-D studies, Steenbock recognized the commercial potential of his work. From that time on he claimed humanitarian reasons for patenting the irradiation process. For one thing, he sought to protect the public from the "patent pirate." That is, he feared that someone else would file patent claims for the practical applications and then charge industry exorbitant sums for their use. However, if he, Steenbock, did the patenting, he could ensure the safest, most healthful dissemination of the patent's applications. To bolster his argument, the biochemist offered the case of insulin, whose researchers used the control inherent in patenting rights to make sure that "the public is protected against the manufacture of poor preparations and is also protected against extortionate charges and to avoid the possibilities of misusing their discovery which not only would have retarded the further development and use of this product, but would also have resulted in causing untold suffering among diabetic patients." Moreover, Steenbock was "unwilling to give unscrupulous food and drug venders [sic] the freedom of marketing this or that irradiated product on the basis of preposterous indefensible claims."6 With a patent he believed that he could supervise licensees and oversee their advertising material. In addition, the payment of royalties could bring much-needed research funding to the University of Wisconsin: the results of research would help fund further research.
Steenbock had another, highly significant, reason for deciding to patent: to keep the irradiation process out of the hands of the oleomargarine manufacturers. Margarine had been invented in the nineteenth century, but this cheap butter substitute composed of animal and vegetable fats did not seriously challenge the dairy industry until World War I, when butter was in short supply. Nutrition research quickly demonstrated that oleo lacked vitamin A, an important nutritional element found in butter, but it soon became possible to correct this deficiency by adding vitamin A during the manufacturing process. A few years later researchers discovered that butter contained vitamin D, which was also missing from oleo. If manufacturers could add vitamin D to margarine, they could claim that oleo was at least nutritionally equal to butter. Steenbock, concerned about protecting Wisconsin's dairy industry, wanted to deny the oleo industry access to an inexpensive source of vitamin D. As he used the oleo question to justify his patent:
In its broad humanitarian aspects it must be granted that any process which can be used to improve our food and thus improve our health should not be encumbered by restrictions of any kind. But there is another aspect to this matter and that is the effect which such a laissez faire policy would have upon the prosperity of that industry which has contributed most to our nutritional welfare, namely, the dairy industry. With the dairy industry the improvement of oleomargarine is a factor which not only would concern the production of butter but the economic status of dairying as a whole. This seemed too big a risk to take especially when considered in relation to the possible reaction of the dairy interests to research at the University.7
According to a colleague, Steenbock's "primary reason for securing the patent . . . was so that license might be withheld from the oleo interests, to protect Wisconsin's dairy industry."8 Many disagreed with Steenbock and felt it inappropriate for university researchers, particularly those employed at land-grant colleges such as the University of Wisconsin, to patent their discoveries. They claimed that inventions and discoveries of faculty and staff at state-financed institutions belonged to the public. A. J. Glover, influential editor of Hoard's Dairyman and a leading spokesperson for the Wisconsin dairy industry, was furious that Steenbock would consider patenting. "Why should the public devote money to discovering new truths only to permit them to be patented and their use determined by some corporations? It seems to me that information discovered by the use of public money belongs to the public and it is difficult for me to understand how such discoveries can be patented and some private corporation determine how they shall be used." He firmly believed that the university had no moral or legal right to take out patents.9
Glover's position received support from key faculty members, most vocally Hart, F. B. Morrison, and Kirk L. Hatch. In the early years of the century, Babcock had brought Hart out to Wisconsin from the Agricultural Experiment Station in Geneva, New York, to become chair of the Department of Agricultural Chemistry and thus relieve him, Babcock, of administrative chores. A tireless researcher as well as a very able administrator, Hart quickly became a disciple of Babcock's. Morrison was a nationally renowned professor of animal husbandry, coauthor of the principal text in the field, and also a disciple of Babcock's. Hart and Morrison, as well as Babcock himself, believed that the results of university research should be available openly and without restriction to all who need them.
Similarly, Hatch, the first director of the university's agricultural extension service, saw university research as an unrestricted contribution to the state's citizens. Consequently he too vehemently opposed Steenbock's patenting plans.10
Morrison generally opposed patenting but did foresee special circumstances in which research "should be patented if a patent were necessary to protect the discovery against unwise and fraudulent use."11 Yet he worried that if university researchers were allowed to patent, they might be attracted to commercially feasible projects instead of to pure, noncommercial research. Thus, patent opponents feared, both the university and scientific research would be tainted with commercialism.12 Some faculty also saw a difference between receiving royalties from books and from patents, but Steenbock believed researchers should be able to protect their findings in the same way that authors copyrighted their ideas.
Both sides of the controversy cited the case of the Babcock tester to justify their respective positions. Babcock had refused to patent his invention in order to ensure its broad application-in other words, for the good of the public. Subsequently, in order to undersell their competitors, manufacturers produced cheaply constructed equipment labeled as the Babcock tester but in which the test bottles, so carefully calibrated by Babcock, were often carelessly fabricated. As a result, this important test was discredited and fell into disuse until states established laboratories to check and standardize the equipment before its sale.13 Years later Morrison used the Babcock tester as an example of the benefits to be derived from not patenting, pointing out that it "is still used universally when anyone wants to show the value of University research to the State and the monetary savings made possible by such research to our people."14 Steenbock, however, focused on the problems that had developed during the early years of the tester and insisted that patenting was for the protection of the public.
To some extent Steenbock's fears of "unscrupulous food and drug venders" using his vitamin-D discoveries were warranted. For example, shortly after his announcement, the Ultra-Vol Co. attempted to sell an oil that was "activated by a violet ray." A Mr. T. J. Brume claimed to have invented a "superior type" of lamp he wanted to sell to irradiate milk at home. Another enterprising manufacturer, Goodall's Laboratories, produced Bottled Sunshine, supposedly olive oil exposed to ultraviolet rays. In its advertising the company ascribed quotations to satisfied customers and even experts, such as Steenbock himself. Goodall's sold its product out of the window of a Chicago drugstore for $1.25 a bottle (see Fig.  1 ). And then there was Joseph P. Sereda, who claimed that his "violet-ray machine" cured some eighty different diseases-from abscess through brain fag and nervousness to whooping cough and writer's cramp. A mazda lamp was shining on a rotating glass plate which was covered with a film of oil that was dripping in a tiny stream from a reservoir above and was being collected in a trough that caught the oil as it flowed off the edge of the rotating plate. The oil was being bottled and the demonstrator was busily engaged in disposing of his cotton seed product to the side walk crowd at a handsome price, making the claim that this product was imbued with wonderful healing properties derived from the electric lamp.'6
The existence of a patent would not prevent all fraudulent use of the process or its name. Yet Steenbock continued to believe he should patent his work. Only with a patent, the professor insisted, could he exert some control over ethical manufacturers and at least partly protect the public.
III. PATENT MANAGEMENT AND THE CREATION OF THE WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION (WARF)
A series of perplexing problems faced Steenbock once he had decided to patent. First came the complicated process of applying for the patent itself. The application process, begun in 1924, was extremely time-consuming and frustrating: the Patent Office raised objection after objection, necessitating numerous revisions and resubmissions. Having eventually acquired his four patents (in 1928, 1932 [two patents], and 193617), Steenbock's next worry concerned patent management-how "to administer the results of research as well as to protect research."18 Someone had to evaluate license applications, supervise licensees, defend against patent infringements, and manage the funds generated from the royalties. Even before the first patent was granted, Steenbock knew he could not handle all these administrative details himself. Moreover, he felt that as a scientist he needed to distance himself from the commercial, profit-making aspects of the patent.
His first thought was to assign the patents to the university. Such an arrangement, he believed, could profit the public, the manufacturing sector, and the university research community. Eager to benefit the public, the university would be liberal in granting licenses; anxious to avoid costly litigation, industry would be willing to pay royalties, monies that in turn would fund research on the campus. Under this system, Steenbock wrote, the "public can be served ade- quately without exploitation and automatically such grants will, to a large extent, protect the public against the charlatan who is always sure to appear with impossible and unwarranted claims." 19 Despite these remarks Steenbock had reservations about offering the University of Wisconsin his patents, reservations stemming from his experiences several years earlier after his development of a chemical process to produce a highly concentrated form of vitamin A. Steenbock, recognizing the commercial potential of this substance for infant foods and medicinals, had been concerned that the oleomargarine industry also might use it to manufacture a more attractive butter substitute. Steenbock offered the vitamin-A process to the university's board of regents, which then engaged a law firm to draw up the patent claims. Arba B. Marvin, the attorney who initially investigated the issue of vitamin patents, eagerly assured Steenbock that "after the applications have been lodged in the patent office I will have some suggestions to offer concerning the sale of fractional rights under these applications as a means of raising money for more research work in your department."20 Evidently, neither the board nor the law firm saw any urgency, and so matters moved slowly. At about the same time, though, the oleo interests established a fellowship to study the vitamin-A process, and, believing that these researchers would apply for a patent themselves, those pursuing the Wisconsin claim abandoned their efforts. Steenbock was extremely disappointed. Several years later, Dean Russell sent a package from Japan, to which the professor replied: "I have received preparation of vitamin A capsules for which accept my thanks as I was glad to get it. However, when I see WARF was created to administer patents for the university's faculty and staff, starting with the Steenbock patents. The foundation was independent of the university, the connection between the two being the transfer of funds from WARF to the university's already-established Research Committee. The committee then selected the projects to be funded. WARF acted as an interface between research, a function of the university, and commerce, a function of industry. WARF, not the professor, granted licenses under the so-called Steenbock patents; the foundations' emblem, not the professor's signature, graced advertisements announcing the vitamin-D potency of irradiated products. The foundation also constructed a laboratory to test the potency of irradiated products to ensure that items using the WARF logo met the standards outlined in their contracts. However, Steenbock worked very closely with WARF, especially during its Russell, one of WARF's most ardent supporters, explained how he saw the duties of the foundation in managing patents for the public good: 1. protecting discoveries from crass commercialism; 2. using licensure to control the quality of the products and their advertising; 3. granting limited licensing to minimize the monopolistic character of patents; and 4. applying profits to further university research. "In a word," he wrote in 1931, "we are hoping to retain all of the social advantages that may come to the public and at the same time handle the business to be developed with something of the efficiency which at least theoretically obtains from private corporate control. We recognize the experimental nature of this effort to socialize these values. Russell, "WARF's Purpose" (cit. n. 13).
formative years in the 1920s and 1930s, so closely that it can be very difficult to separate his role from that of WARF trustees or the WARF laboratory. Moreover, WARF, and often Steenbock personally, oversaw the advertising campaigns of manufacturers licensed under the Steenbock patents to see that companies did not make unwarranted claims and promises (see Fig. 2 ). WARF even produced its own advertisements to educate the public about vitamin D and irradiated products (see Fig. 3 ).
IV. LICENSING
Steenbock had correctly foreseen the commercial potential of his vitamin-D research. One of the first manufacturers to approach him about his vitamin-D process was Quaker Oats. Studies had demonstrated that dental caries were common in countries and areas where oatmeal was widely consumed. Moreover, nutritional experiments had shown convincingly that test animals fed oatmeal exclusively were more likely to develop rickets. As early as June 1925 representatives of the company visited the university and "stated without qualification that it [ultraviolet irradiation] was the greatest discovery yet made in the field of nutrition and they were frank to state that they were desirous of taking over the rights to the process for cereal products, and stated their willingness to spend money freely for the investigation and to make suitable contracts covering the case. "26
The contract drawn up between Quaker Oats and WARF in February 1927, even before Steenbock had been granted his first patent, represented a compromise between Steenbock's idealism and the realities of the marketplace. Despite his discomfort with granting any manufacturer an exclusive contract, Steenbock understood that the Quaker Oats Company needed a promise of exclusivity before embarking on the costly construction and testing of irradiation equipment. In fact, he used just such a situation to argue for patenting. Before investing heavily in product development, companies needed to know that other firms could not just copy their processes and undersell the developers. Therefore WARF granted Quaker Oats exclusive use of the process for their products until 1940. WARF also recognized the expense of designing, constructing, and testing new technology; consequently, the contract limited the initial royalties paid by Quaker Oats to $5,000 a year. However, once the company began marketing irradiated products the royalty schedule increased first to $25,000, then to $35,000, and afterward to $60,000 a year.27
Other manufacturers saw in irradiated products more palatable, more attractive forms of vitamin D than the usual cod-liver oil. Fish oils had long been used as a remedy for such conditions as rheumatism and gout and also as a general tonic. In the early years of the twentieth century researchers demonstrated that some fats, including cod-liver oil, contained vitamin A and that there was a connection between this vital food accessory and some eye conditions. A short while later, others proved that rickets was a dietary deficiency disease and that certain oils, especially cod-liver oil, exerted preventive and curative effects in rachitic cases. At first researchers thought that vitamin A was the antirachitic factor, but :S ': ,, -. ' ',.,^. , ..... -. . ' . s -' ........... advertising irradiated products that were both antirachitic and more appetizing than cod-liver oil.
Only a few months after publication of his early work, in 1924, Steenbock was approached by pharmaceutical houses such as Eli Lilly and Abbott Laboratories. Despite the companies' great interest, the biochemist felt that talk of the development of vitamin-D supplements was then premature. By 1928, however, he had concluded that several pharmaceutical houses were probably using his irradiation process without license or control. Subsequently WARF entered into negotiations with four firms (Abbott Laboratories, Mead Johnson, Parke Davis, and Winthrop Chemical Co.) to draw up a mutually advantageous contract, one that would ensure WARF royalties and control over the production of a new vitamin-D substance, named Viosterol (actually irradiated ergosterol), and that would afford the companies protection from competition. E. R. Squibb was also eager to gain a license. As the largest producer of cod-liver oil in the country, the company stood to lose a great deal if it were excluded from the negotiations. Squibb was so anxious to be licensed that it agreed to the royalties demanded by WARF, though company executives considered the price too high. By March 1929 differences between the companies and WARF were resolved, and the foundation granted licenses to all five.29
Other In addition, a multitude of food manufacturers were anxious to irradiate their products. Interested firms ranged from Anheuser Busch, the beer manufacturer, and Fleischmann's, producer of yeast, to C. E. Wheelock, manufacturer of jams and jellies, and Bottled Beverages, Inc., of Cleveland, Ohio, who in 1929 were "working on a chocolate drink with the idea of introducing Vitamine 'D' thru irradiated argosterol [sic] . This, of course, will make a chocolate drink worthwhile to sell to the public school children and other kiddies thruout the land."32 Most of the many, many letters of inquiry met with rejection. Steenbock explained that WARF issued licenses only to "the most important food products such as milk, cereal, fats, and the like"; thus researchers could "ascertain the reaction of the public" and "have available exact data on the physiological effect of the product on human nutrition."33 Nonetheless, several companies were able to work out satisfactory licensing contracts with WARF.
As their dealings with Quaker Oats and the pharmaceutical companies demonstrate, Steenbock and the foundation soon developed a keen appreciation of the realities of commerce. Another telling case is that of Wisconsin's dairy industry. On the question of oleomargarine versus butter, even faculty members usually reluctant to see university research patented agreed with Steenbock that patenting was necessary. Denying an irradiation license to oleomargarine, these profes- The decision to develop UVO should not suggest that Steenbock or even WARF cared only for monetary gain. The motivations of researchers and the foundation were much too complex to warrant such a simplistic conclusion. The expense of the irradiation process raised the price of milk, whereas concentrates were so cheap that there was no difference in price between vitamin-D milk and unfortified milk. "Our original goal in the fluid milk field," the trustees reminded themselves in 1936, "was to secure the treatment of the milk of the masses. We will never realize this on the basis of a premium milk." While concerned for its financial health, the WARF board of trustees was also acutely aware of its social responsibilities. 37
V. RESEARCH AND THE PROBLEM OF COMMERCIALIZATION
By the 1940s WARF was firmly established and financially secure. Steenbock's dream had become reality. The biochemist had wanted to protect the public from fraud and quackery; therefore, he insisted on patenting his discovery. He had wanted to acquire and disburse funds for further research without the taint of commercialism; thus he designed and established the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation to manage the patents. The dream had become reality, but a reality shaped also by the pressures of the marketplace.
To avoid any hint of profiteering from his discovery, Steenbock refused to accept a share of the royalties paid to WARF. He worried that payments would compromise his position as a scientist and that other researchers might bargain with the foundation over royalties, thus commercializing the procedure. However, the WARF trustees insisted that he receive some remuneration. They argued that if Steenbock received nothing from the foundation for his patents, other faculty might be unwilling to turn their patents over to WARF. Finally the board of trustees forced Steenbock to accept 15 percent of the net income generated from his patents; WARF invested the remaining 85 percent.38
Though at first unwilling to accept any royalties, over the years Steenbock came to appreciate the money, which he used to fund additional research. In other ways, too, his views changed under the press of commercial considerations. Before the founding of WARF, the professor clearly sought to establish himself as a researcher and to eschew the role of applied scientist. In the early By 1942, as we have seen, a disillusioned Steenbock had even accepted the irradiation of oleomargarine, the one product he had always insisted must not be licensed.
VI. WARF'S DEVELOPMENT
Since its establishment in 1925 the foundation had changed also. A pioneer among nonprofit, university-affiliated patent-management agencies, WARF had become a model, emulated throughout the United States. By 1956 there were more than fifty similar, separately incorporated organizations.42 At the beginning WARF's trustees, primarily business people and lawyers working on a volunteer basis, conducted nearly all the business of the foundation. But soon the phenomenal success of the Steenbock patents demanded more professional administration. The problem of patent litigation plagued the foundation. As patents were granted, the task of reviewing license applications grew; so did the job of negotiating royalties and monitoring payments. The WARF laboratory kept busy testing licensed products to make sure they met foundation standards. Similarly, WARF personnel, and often Steenbock, reviewed and rewrote advertisements for products licensed by WARF. These tasks constitute one side of patent management. WARF also handled the investment and disbursement of royalties.43 With interest in the Steenbock patents high in the 1930s, the royalty fund increased dramatically.
As early as the late 1920s the administration of the many components of WARF clearly required the involvement of a full-time director and professional staff. The trustees selected Dean Harry Russell to head WARF. In 1925 the dean had supported Steenbock's proposal to patent the irradiation process, and he had urged the university to accept and administer the patents. Though recognizing problems with this arrangement, he was nevertheless strongly convinced that the benefits outweighed any difficulties. "This discovery is fraught with so much significance," he wrote the university's president, Edward A. Birge, "that the University cannot afford to make the mistake of neglecting the opportunity of perhaps controlling this patent in such a way as will probably redound materially to the benefit of further scientific research. The foundation's accomplishment resulted from a combination of fortuitous circumstances. The first was the Steenbock patents themselves. Vitamin D was in great demand, and the irradiation process made it relatively easy to market. Licensees were eager to pay royalties for the use of the patents. Then there was the time, energy, and skill donated by dedicated alumni and the efforts of Russell, the first director. Together the patents and the people established a strong basis for WARF's endowment fund. Journalism professor Clarence Schoenfeld, writing in a pamphlet he compiled for WARF, identifies four other important factors: "the exquisite timing that allowed WARF initially to escape, on the one hand, the stockmarket crash of 1929 and on the other, for a time, the arrival of onerous anti-trust and income-tax interpretations"; "imaginative marketing, legal defense, and money-management strategies"; "the good luck or grace that has produced, one after another, a series of lucrative patents"; and "the happy circumstance that each of those processes or products in turn has made such a profound contribution to the human condition."52 WARF is, in a word, unique.
VII. AFTERMATH OF THE STEENBOCK PATENTS: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
Yet despite WARF's success, the rationale underlying its development remained in dispute: Should university researchers patent their discoveries? Over the years there were those who still maintained that discoveries and inventions emerging from university research should be given freely to the public, to benefit all without pecuniary profit for some. Consequently, WARF continued to face charges of unfair licensing practices. One 1947 article criticized the foundation for withholding vitamin-D licenses from products outside the dairy industry, explaining, "The University of Wisconsin is supported by the taxpaying dairy industry. Poor people, who are in the greatest need of Vitamin D, could not have vitamin D put into oleomargarine, a spread that they could afford. This would have been contrary to the interests of the dairymen. "53 Others who felt it wrong that Steenbock patented his ultraviolet process took more direct action; they challenged the patents in court. In the summer of 1943 the Federal Court of Appeals in San Francisco held Steenbock's patents invalid. But, it is important to note, the court did not rule on whether a university or researcher could patent a discovery. The court decided on much narrower grounds instead: the irradiation of foods with ultraviolet rays was a natural process; Steenbock had discovered it but not invented it; and, most significantly, as a natural process it could not be patented. WARF continued the Was Steenbock wise to patent his process? Were his critics vindicated? Had WARF managed to balance successfully the demands of research funding, the public welfare, and commercial growth? Clearly there is no simple answer. True, the patents, while they lasted, gave Steenbock and WARF some control over the commercial use of irradiation, enabling them to insist on standards of production and truth in advertising. Also, the royalties generated an enviable endowment fund for research at the University of Wisconsin. Still, WARF and Steenbock were, as they had to be, influenced by market considerations. As Steenbock rationalized: "While, of course, there are many questions of scientific interest which could be investigated. . . , there are some which under the circumstances assume more importance than others. Although, of course, it is not our desire to emphasize the practical unduly, yet it appears that there is no reason why certain phases distinctly scientific should not be given preference because of their utilitarian aspect. 55 The development of UVO, the denial of a license to the oleomargarine industry, the licensing of only five pharmaceutical houses, the granting of patents to Quaker Oats-all were decisions informed by commercial factors.
This chronicle of WARF and the Steenbock patents clearly demonstrates the problems and possibilities of patenting the results of university research. Advocates emphasize the importance of control, as Steenbock did.56 A consistent theme running through his work and writing is his conscious commitment to the public good; he genuinely feared the effects of the uncontrolled application of irradiation. He devoted much of his research to devising more effective irradiation processes. Additionally, he felt responsible for the implementation of irradiation and thus impelled to monitor the products produced with his patents. Clearly, patenting shaped his laboratory work. That he spent time on application development and product testing could be interpreted as a "commercialization" of his research. It is clear, however, that he would have characterized it as "humanitarian," as protecting the public.
Those opposed to patenting focus on the "money-making" aspects of the procedure and equate patenting with excessive royalties. In the 1920s and 1930s, for example, there were those who insisted that irradiated products would be much less expensive if manufacturers had no royalties to pay. They pointed to WARF's undeniably large endowment fund as proof of profiteering. Therefore, opponents find that patenting is detrimental to the public good.
Today the debate over patenting university research is somewhat muted, and 
